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Abstract
Kevin Laland and colleagues have put forward a number of arguments motivating an extended evolutionary synthesis. Here I 
examine Laland et al.’s central concept of reciprocal causation. Reciprocal causation features in many arguments supporting 
an expanded evolutionary framework, yet few of these arguments are clearly delineated. Here I clarify the concept and make 
explicit three arguments in which it features. I identify where skeptics can—and are—pushing back against these arguments, 
and highlight what I see as the empirical, explanatory, and methodological issues at stake.
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Introduction
Over the last 40 years researchers of many stripes have 
critiqued the structure of evolutionary theory on causal 
grounds.1 This line of criticism has been developed in new 
ways by Kevin Laland and colleagues. Their arguments have 
attracted significant attention, especially those arguing for 
a new evolutionary framework, what they call an extended 
evolutionary synthesis (EES) (see: Laland et al. 2014, 2015, 
2017; Laland 2015). The EES is just one of a number of 
recent attempts to craft a new evolutionary framework,2 yet 
has quickly assumed a central role in such discussions. There 
are now a number of publications either building upon (e.g., 
Mesoudi et al. 2013; Fuentes 2016; Piperno 2017; Zeder 
2017; Lu and Bourrat 2018; Uller and Helanterä 2019) or 
critiquing its proposals (e.g., Dickins and Rahman 2012; 
Dickins and Barton 2013; Calcott 2013; Wray et al. 2014; 
Charlesworth et al. 2017; Welch 2017).
Central to the EES critique is whether the consensus 
practice of current evolutionary theory suffices to explain 
evolutionary phenomena. Following Kitcher (1993), I use 
consensus practice to refer to the persisting and shared prac-
tices within a scientific domain that enact typical approaches 
to carrying out research, determine the salience and impor-
tance of research questions, and set up the standards for 
evaluating candidate explanations. Such shared practices 
are inculcated in researchers through their education, train-
ing, and hands-on experience with evolutionary reasoning. 
Though such inculcation is likely to be highly individual-
ized, it can be approximated by the structure and presenta-
tion of evolutionary theory as found in standard textbooks 
(e.g., Futuyma and Kirkpatrick 2017; see Love 2010).
One important feature of the EES argument concerns 
the overall integration of evolutionary theory as enacted by 
consensus practice. Such integration can be more or less 
centralized or eclectic (Lewens 2015). The difference hinges 
on the extent to which the consensus practice has a central 
theoretical, conceptual, or methodological core. The more 
that consensus practice has a central and well-integrated set 
of models, theories, assumptions, and standards of explana-
tion the more centralized and “core-like” its organization. 
By contrast, when there is a loose patchwork of research 
methods and explanatory criteria, perhaps put in the service 
of multiple distinct sets of research aims, the more eclectic 
the organization of consensus practice.
Broadly speaking, EES proponents have argued that 
consensus practice is centralized, and thus that there is a 
“core-like” organization of consensus practice. Thus they 
argue that “core assumptions” (Laland et al. 2015), “central 
tenets” (Pigliucci and Müller 2010), or “core logic” (Müller 
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2017) need updating and change.3 To put it another way, 
EES proponents are optimists: they see new tools, models, 
and concepts as expanding the core of evolutionary theory 
through methodological and conceptual revision. Oppo-
nents of the EES (again, speaking broadly) are skeptics: they 
hold that consensus practice stands in good stead and that 
the phenomena motivating optimists’ arguments—at least 
inclusive inheritance, developmental bias, and phenotypic 
plasticity—are either non-existent, marginal, already well-
understood, currently within reach of standard evolutionary 
models, or some combination thereof. Such skeptics thus 
deny that EES research challenges or radically alters the 
shared core of consensus practice.
To shed some light on these conflicting evaluations of 
the EES, I analyze one of the optimists’ central concepts: 
reciprocal causation (Laland et al. 2011, 2013a, b, 2015, 
2015). Reciprocal causation is a “defining” and “unifying” 
theme of the EES, and one taken to challenge causal assump-
tions embedded in the models and explanations of consensus 
practice. Yet the positive epistemic merits of this concept 
are unclear, as a range of competing interpretations seem to 
show (Calcott 2013; Dickins and Barton 2013; Martínez and 
Esposito 2014; Watson et al. 2016; Svensson 2018).
In light of these interpretive differences, the central task 
of this article is identification and clarification: to interpret 
and carefully distinguish those places where the positive 
epistemic value of reciprocal causation might be used to 
argue for changes to consensus practice. Below I find three 
such arguments. Though supported by quotes and arguments 
from the EES and its interpreters, these lines of argumenta-
tion have not received full articulation by proponents. They 
are thus best understood as extrapolations or interpreta-
tions—possible ways in which the concept of reciprocal 
causation might be used to argue the case for the EES.
This exegetical and evaluative strategy is important. 
As the dialectic between EES optimists and skeptics has 
progressed, there have been increasing claims of misunder-
standing on both sides.4 It is important to move past the 
rhetoric and isolate what the potential benefits of the EES 
are taken to be, whether there are arguments to support these 
claims, as well as where the concepts and methods of a new 
synthesis break from the empirical, conceptual, and theoreti-
cal understanding of current consensus practice.
Reciprocal Causation
What is reciprocal causation? As I see it, EES research-
ers use the concept in two ways. The first is in a straight-
forwardly causal sense. This takes reciprocal causation to 
be a kind of causal relationship, one where two processes 
exert a mutual influence on one another (Laland et al. 2011, 
2013a; Mesoudi et al. 2013). In many places, this is all that 
EES optimists have in mind when they use the concept. As 
Laland et al. (2015, p. 6) write: “The term ‘reciprocal causa-
tion’ simply means that process A is a cause of process B, 
and subsequently, process B is a cause of process A, with this 
feedback potentially repeated in causal chains.” Though the 
causal detail of such mutual influence may differ from case 
to case, the idea is at root a simple one: two causal processes 
are reciprocally linked insofar as they are coupled processes 
where the state of one is a function of the other (and vice 
versa).
On this understanding, reciprocal causal processes con-
trast with unidirectional ones–causal relationships where 
mutual influences are negligible or non-existent. So stated, 
unidirectional causation characterizes many familiar cases 
of causation: rocks falling to the ground, billiard balls col-
liding, and solar radiation warming the earth. Speaking more 
generally, unidirectional causation characterizes situations 
with asymmetric relationships between causes and effects. 
To use Woodward’s (2003) terminology, these are situations 
where there are no significant influences feeding back from 
the changed effect variable to a subsequent change in the 
cause variable.
Researchers in the life sciences are familiar with this 
construal of reciprocal causation. It is the causal relation-
ship enacted in runaway sexual selection, in the positive 
and negative frequency-dependent selection of population 
genetics, in gene-network diagrams of evolutionary devel-
opmental biology, and the complex interactions of cellu-
lar metabolism. In all of these domains and more besides, 
researchers model coupled processes of mutual influence 
between elements.
Yet EES proponents also use reciprocal causation in a 
more substantial manner, often taking it to be central to a 
revised picture of evolution and evolutionary change (Laland 
et al. 2014, 2015; Watson et al. 2016; Laland et al. 2017). 
This construal of reciprocal causation incorporates feedback 
and interaction across multiple causal levels, with a particu-
lar emphasis on organismic behavior as a central cause mod-
ulating selection regimes. On this conception of reciprocal 
causation, organismic activity is locked in relationships of 
mutual influence with developmental and evolutionary envi-
ronments through trophic exchange, excretion, and move-
ment. More evocatively, this is a picture where “developing 
organisms are not solely products, but are also causes, of 
4 For an example, see the heated back-and-forth between Gupta et al. 
(2017a, b) and Feldman et al. (2017). A more subdued confrontation 
can be found in Laland et al. (2014) and Wray et al. (2014).
3 Though see Love (2010, 2013, 2017) who criticizes the represen-
tations of the structure of evolutionary theory that the language of 
“core” suggests.
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evolution” (Laland et al. 2015, p. 6). To optimists, the radi-
cal theoretical implications of this more substantial construal 
of reciprocal causation are conspicuous in processes of niche 
construction, particularly where the activities of a popula-
tion generate systematic changes in the developmental and 
selective environments of downstream generations (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003).
Again, in the interest of evenhandedness, one should note that 
consensus-practice researchers are familiar with this more sub-
stantial construal of reciprocal causation. Organismic effects on 
selection regimes are especially prominent in evolutionary ecol-
ogy as exemplified in the rich empirical and theoretical work on 
predator–prey dynamics, parental effects, and social evolution. 
So acknowledging the explanatory value of a more substantial 
construal of reciprocal causation need not necessitate further 
methodological and conceptual change. Indeed, skeptics note 
that niche construction is most often presented—and perhaps 
is best understood—in a deflationary way. This deflationary 
understanding takes work in niche construction as an attempt to 
model a range of novel selection dynamics, rather than a radical 
challenge to consensus practice (e.g., Wray et al. 2014).
Nonetheless, EES optimists see the substantial view 
of reciprocal causation as supporting their claims of an 
expanded and extended consensus practice. Their argument 
here relies not just on reciprocal causation, but on an idi-
osyncratic understanding of the history and organization of 
evolutionary theory. This is visible when EES optimists char-
acterize the modelling assumption of consensus practice they 
call fractionation (Walsh 2015; Uller and Helanterä 2019).
Fractionation is a strategy for representing and modelling 
evolutionary dynamics that takes the component processes of 
evolution to operate autonomously. “Autonomous” here means 
that causes underpinning evolutionary change—development 
and survival, replication and inheritance, and the generation 
of novelty and variation—are distinct realms of causal activ-
ity with negligible causal links holding between them. On a 
fractionated picture of evolution, for instance, the processes 
involved in generating mutations and innovations (e.g., copying 
errors, chromosomal recombination) do not directly affect the 
developmental machinery that generates phenotypes. Instead, 
mutations merely transform the content-carrying genetic vehi-
cles that are translated by such developmental machinery.
Fractionation is an epistemic strategy, one that represents 
evolution as occurring in a sequence of noninteracting steps. 
In this way, fractionation is no different than other model-
ling assumptions in evolutionary theory, for instance, the 
assumption of infinite population size present in many popu-
lation genetic models. Yet when viewed over historical time, 
representational strategies can become so entrenched that 
alternatives become difficult to imagine; the strategies begin 
to seem foundational, perhaps even ontological. Indeed, this 
claim is central to Walsh’s (2015) historical reconstruction 
of contemporary evolutionary theory: over the span of the 
20th century, the assumptions of fractionation have become 
so cemented in consensus practice that they are no longer 
visible as assumptions, but are instead taken to be veridical 
representations of the evolutionary processes.
Walsh’s position is contentious, and one I have considered 
elsewhere (Buskell and Currie 2017). Still, even if one were 
to take Walsh’s argument at face value, one could still be 
skeptical about its scope: fractionation does not seem to char-
acterize much of evolutionary developmental biology, quan-
titative genetics, or ecology. To the extent it has purchase, it 
is on particular modelling strategies in behavioral ecology 
and population genetics (Welch 2017). It is not unreasonable 
to wonder, then, what the broader implications of reciprocal 
causation might be. After all, if reciprocal causation contrasts 
with fractionation, and this merely characterizes a small sub-
set of methods in evolutionary biology, the broader edifice of 
the EES seems to be built on shaky ground.
Here EES optimists adopt a distinctive strategy: they 
suggest that fractionation does in fact characterize much 
of consensus practice. This is because population genetics 
forms the core of consensus practice in evolutionary theory. 
Drawing together a range of historical sources, optimists 
construct a historical narrative where population genetics 
is central to the rise of “The Modern Synthesis.” This, they 
take to be a broad theoretical framework still in place today.
Recall above I suggested that one important dividing line 
between EES optimists and skeptics is the extent to which 
they see new research as requiring an overhaul of core 
consensus practice. Optimists see such changes as either 
incipient or currently ongoing, while skeptics deny that 
EES research substantially alters consensus practice. What 
the optimists’ historical framing aims to achieve is both the 
identification of a core to consensus practice—the fraction-
ated assumptions of population genetics—as well as a dem-
onstration of plausible, empirically fruitful alternatives.
Yet these arguments are contentious. First, it is unclear 
to what extent consensus practice is, or was, centralized, 
around population genetical models, theories, and assump-
tions. Love’s (2010, 2013), for instance, adopts an erotectic 
approach and argues that evolutionary theory may be eclecti-
cally organized around a range of discipline-specific research 
questions. Second, the historical narrative is questionable. 
Historians, philosophers, and evolutionary researchers have 
consistently criticized narratives that posit a single event, 
the Modern Synthesis, dominated by formal mathematical 
models of population genetics.5
5 Perhaps the most congenial narrative to the optimists’ historical 
framing comes from Provine (1971), though Provine himself denied 
the centrality of population genetics to evolutionary theory, for 
instance, as seen in his (1980) work. Other historians have also chal-
lenged the idea of a single event that could be called the Modern Syn-
thesis, such as Smocovitis (1996), Cain (2009), and Milam (2010).
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Still, even if this historical framing is suspect, that EES 
optimists argue against fractionation does mean arguing 
against prevailing theoretical and modelling assumptions in 
high-profile areas of evolutionary research. To the extent that 
their arguments for theoretical or methodological change are 
convincing, then, they might still motivate changes to how 
consensus practice understands, represents, and theorizes 
about evolution. If organisms are in constant interaction with 
the world, involved in complex webs of mutual causal influ-
ence—perhaps generating environmental regularities in the 
world that can “flip” latent developmental switches (West-
Eberhard 2003)—then the causal assumptions of consensus 
practice may be called into question.
As all of this makes clear, the positive epistemic value of 
reciprocal causation is linked to how well it brings complex 
webs of mutual influence into view. This might involve iden-
tifying new kinds of reciprocal causal links, providing new 
empirical tools, or showing how consensus practice fails to 
represent crucial causal features in evolutionary change. Yet 
a key problem for EES proponents is in articulating how 
exactly reciprocal causation facilitates or renders visible 
such mutual causal influence. While EES proponents suggest 
that reciprocal causation is part of a package of ideas that 
“is more than simply ‘business as usual’ science: it requires 
conceptual change” (Laland et al. 2015, p. 10), there are 
countervailing claims. Those most closely aligned with what 
I identify as the “skeptical” position hold that reciprocal 
causation is ubiquitous in consensus practice and thus that 
the concept brings about no radical conceptual or theoretical 
change (Dickins and Barton 2013; Futuyma 2017; Svensson 
2018). Somewhere between the two positions are research-
ers who argue that while reciprocal causation does bring 
added conceptual resources to evolutionary theorizing, these 
merely facilitate the generation of new empirical tools, and 
that only these further resources can possibly challenge con-
sensus practice (Martínez and Esposito 2014; Watson et al. 
2016). What these various interpretations show is that the 
concept of reciprocal causation is ambiguous, and poten-
tially pressed in the service of multiple aims.
Here I suggest that one can identify three plausible lines 
of argumentation for the positive empirical value of recipro-
cal causation. These strategies differ in how reciprocal cau-
sation brings added conceptual, theoretical, and empirical 
resources to bear in understanding complex webs of causal 
interaction—and as a result, how the concept is supposed to 
challenge consensus evolutionary practice. These three lines 
of argumentation are:
Empirical aptness: reciprocal causation is ubiquitous 
among causes that underpin evolutionary phenomena, 
and models that employ reciprocal causation are thus 
more likely to be empirically apt for investigating at least 
some aspects of these phenomena;
Rigging the system: reciprocal causation partly explains 
stable selection pressures by highlighting the role of top-
down developmental and behavioral constraints;
Keeping an open mind: reciprocal causation provides a 
causal framework that can correct for insidious practices 
limiting the power of evolutionary theory.
As suggested above, these arguments involve a certain 
amount of interpretation and extrapolation. What follows 
is thus a consideration of several possible ways that recip-
rocal causation might positively contribute to evolutionary 
research. In identifying and articulating these lines of argu-
ments, I identify those places where skeptics might push (or 
are already pushing) back against EES claims.
Empirical Aptness
Reciprocal causation is not new to biology. Causal rela-
tionships between key evolutionary processes are familiar 
from work on sexual selection, parent–offspring conflict, 
frequency-dependent selection, and density-dependent 
selection. In each of these, parameter or trait values of a 
conspecific (for instance, female preference) can both influ-
ence, and be influenced by, the parameter or trait value of 
another conspecific (for instance, male displays). To these 
conspecific examples, one can add a host of interspecies 
coevolutionary phenomena including mutualism, crypsis, 
mimicry, and Red Queen effects. EES optimists, therefore, 
are in good company when they assert “reciprocal causation 
to be a typical, perhaps even universal feature of evolving 
and developing systems” (Laland et al. 2015, p. 7). The ubiq-
uity of reciprocal causation is an assumption shared with 
consensus evolutionary practice.
On the back of such consensus, then, it seems somewhat 
unusual to claim that the approach of the life sciences needs 
to change; that, because of its ubiquity, “reciprocal causation 
should now be regarded as the norm, rather than the excep-
tion” (Laland et al. 2013a, p. 738). Remarks such as these 
call out for interpretation.
One weak interpretation would take this claim to be an 
empirical hypothesis about the ubiquity of reciprocal causa-
tion in biology, without assuming that theoretical or method-
ological implications follow. This, for instance, seems to be 
the position of Svensson (2018) who suggests that reciprocal 
causation draws our attention to the complexity of evolution-
ary phenomena and the need for greater collaboration among 
researchers. While this is one possible interpretation of the 
role of reciprocal causation, EES optimists seem to think 
it has broader implications. These come into view if one 
holds not only that reciprocal causation is ubiquitous, but 
also that some important causal processes in evolution need 
to be modelled as such. Embedded within such a stance is a 
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corollary claim—that current consensus practice does not do 
such modelling or does not have the resources to carry it out. 
Interpreting reciprocal causation in this way generates an 
empirical issue: are there kinds of evolutionary phenomena 
that require, or would be better investigated by, representing 
evolution in terms of reciprocal causation?
We can construe this as a problem of empirical aptness: 
does the concept of reciprocal causation help make progress 
towards the goals of inquiry? Empirical aptness, in other 
words, is a relationship between a researcher’s resources 
and the generation of epistemic goods (e.g., explanations, 
understanding, the articulation of theory). Such goods are 
produced in the pursuit of what Brigandt and Love (2010, 
2012) call “problem” or “explanatory agendas,” research 
questions that structure and set goals for empirical inquiry. 
As Brigandt and Love argue, what counts as satisfactory pro-
duction of goods will be determined and refined as research 
progresses: empirical investigation reveals “assumptions 
about what it means to generate an adequate explanatory 
framework” (Brigandt and Love 2010). Determining the 
empirical aptness of reciprocal causation means not only 
evaluating its role in generating empirical methods and tools 
for everyday research, but also its place in structuring and 
guiding inquiry across a community of researchers.
Understanding that reciprocal causation may have this 
dual role—a role in generating empirical tools and also 
structuring empirical investigations—can help to explain the 
otherwise puzzling strategy of EES optimists who attempt 
to argue for change to consensus practice on the back of 
widespread consensus about empirical matters of fact.
Above I showed that reciprocal causation is widely rec-
ognized as an important phenomenon in a number of popu-
lational genetic, ecological, and developmental domains. 
Interestingly, there is also widespread consensus that the 
reciprocal causal phenomena EES optimists see as central 
to their framework—at least niche construction, inclu-
sive inheritance, phenotypic plasticity, and developmental 
bias—are real bona fide phenomena. Nonetheless, whether 
these phenomena should be central targets for evolutionary 
research is another matter. Laland et al. (2014) suggest that 
consensus practice “consistently frames these phenomena 
in a way that undermines their significance” (p. 164). Yet 
a response by Wray et al. (2014) argues that, “none of the 
phenomena championed by Laland et al. are neglected in 
evolutionary biology… [the] prominence that these four 
phenomena command in the discourse of contemporary 
evolutionary theory reflects their proven explanatory power, 
not a lack of attention” (p. 163). Understanding this debate 
as about pursuit-worthiness and the broader theoretical and 
empirical significance—rather than theoretical and empirical 
validity—helps to clarify what is at stake.
Nonetheless, EES researchers do think that their pro-
posed framework also brings with it new empirical tools 
and hypotheses. The positive merits of these, I’ve suggested, 
are tied to their abilities in rendering visible complex webs 
of mutual influence at multiple levels. Is there evidence that 
reciprocal causation aids in the generation of such tools? 
While the EES points to a wide range of sources as being 
amenable to, and perhaps supporting, a picture of recipro-
cal causation (reviewed in Laland et al. 2015), much of this 
work antedates the conceptual and theoretical innovations 
of the ESS. It is thus unclear whether and to what extent the 
EES or the concept of reciprocal causation is central to these 
empirical endeavors. Still, I think there are two examples 
that support the claim that reciprocal causation does in fact 
provide a novel conceptual resource that generates new kinds 
of tools for researchers, and identifies new lines of research 
to pursue.
The first comes from Uller and Helanterä (2019) who 
argue that various niche-construction models and concepts 
are better suited to exploring evolvability. Here, evolvability 
is understood as the possible trajectories that populations 
could take through some abstract multidimensional trait 
space (see also Brown 2014). Uller and Helanterä’s reason-
ing hinges on the contrastive character of causal explana-
tions; why for example, do orchid mantises look like this 
orchid rather than that one? As they suggest, given knowl-
edge about the developmental resources, behavioral flexibil-
ity, and environmental resources of a particular population, 
the reciprocal causation concept provides added resources to 
consider a wider range of explanatory contrasts—especially 
those where organismic activity alters the circumstances of 
development.
Their case study considers beach mice (Peromyscus 
polionotus). Prior work has revealed that a single-nucleotide 
polymorphism modulates the coat color of these mice and 
aids in the avoidance of predators by selecting for lighter-
coated mice on light, sandy beaches, and darker-coated 
mice on inland terrain (Hoekstra et al. 2006). Yet Uller and 
Helanterä argue that this gene-based story is not the only 
evolutionary trajectory that populations of beach mice could 
have taken; with the aid of reciprocal causation, a broader 
range of evolutionary possibilities come into view. Uller and 
Helanterä focus their energies on characterizing develop-
mental niche construction, where systematic changes in the 
parent generation can structure the developmental resources 
of daughter generations. Here they suggest that such sys-
tematic changes could have involved changes to burrow-
ing behavior, sensitivities to the signals of aerial predation, 
movement into new terrains. Importantly, several of these 
counterfactual trajectories hinge on the role of social learn-
ing, where the behavioral strategies of the parent generation 
influence the daughter generation’s exposure to and affective 
valence of stimuli.
Uller and Helanterä’s example is speculative, but draws 
on the rich literatures on parental effects, social transmission, 
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and niche construction. If they are right, then consensus 
practice does seem to neglect certain kinds of explanatory 
contrasts—particularly those involving intergenerational 
effects that shape the plastic capacities of organisms. The 
concept of reciprocal causation might thus play an important 
role in drawing attention to, and providing theoretical mod-
els for, these underinvestigated evolutionary phenomena.
Yet there are reasons to be skeptical that such explana-
tory contrasts are, in fact, ignored. There is a large litera-
ture within ecology on the plastic responses of populations 
and individuals within changing environmental circum-
stance (reviewed in Schlicting and Pigliucci 1998; West-
Eberhard 2003; DeWitt and Scheiner 2004). Moreover, 
this literature covers a wide range of finely demarcated 
scenarios including “switch-like” change brought about 
through threshold responses (e.g., Lively 1986), graded 
change based on continuous variation (e.g., Schoeppner 
and Relyea 2008), and variable temporal expression such 
as seasonal polyphenism (e.g., Brakefield and Frankino 
2009). Perhaps most important for current purposes, there 
is now a growing body of empirical and theoretical work 
investigating the costs of evolving plasticity itself and how 
this might factor into the understanding of long-term evo-
lutionary trends (Murren et al. 2015). So when it comes 
to understanding the role of plasticity in bringing about 
evolutionary change—even change within one or a few 
generations—it is unclear that the concept of recipro-
cal causation is central in bringing to light unnoticed or 
underrepresented explanatory contrasts.
Yet consider a second example drawn from the work of 
Watson and colleagues (Watson et al. 2014, 2016; Watson 
and Szathmáry 2016; Kouvaris et al. 2017), who develop 
an analogy between evolution and learning theory—par-
ticularly between gene networks and neural networks 
(Vohradsky 2001a, b). Building on a rich body of for-
mal theorizing, Watson et al. suggest that the tools and 
methods from learning theory provide added traction on 
a number of outstanding theoretical and philosophical 
issues in evolutionary theory, including major transitions 
in individuality, ecosystem dynamics, the evolution of 
genome architecture, and intriguingly, the ability of natu-
ral selection to generalize and “anticipate” future selective 
environments.
Anticipation and generalization are features familiar 
from the literature on network architectures (Clark 1993). 
After training on a set of stimuli, networks can general-
ize to similar stimuli—a feat called “signal” or “prototype 
extraction.” So, for instance, after being exposed to a train-
ing set of unusual dogs—say, obscure breeds like Pulis 
or Lagotto Romangolos—a connectionist network would 
be able to recognize and categorize more familiar breeds 
(Labradors, terriers). Watson et al. suggest that evolution 
is able to achieve similar feats at multiple causal levels. 
Evolution can pick up on “deep regularities”—structural 
clusterings of properties—that facilitate adaptive responses 
at multiple temporal and spatial scales. In this way, evolu-
tion can generalize to novel, though structurally similar, 
selective environments. As they suggest, “evolution thus 
acquires information from past selection in the same prin-
cipled way that simple learning systems acquire informa-
tion from past experience” (Watson and Szathmáry 2016, 
p. 148).
Reciprocal causation is central to this story, as it intro-
duces a way of tweaking the parameters of evolutionary 
change (selection, variation, and heritability) that represent 
constraints on the mappings between networks and behavior. 
These reciprocal linkages are seen in the kind of reciprocal 
causal phenomena highlighted by EES optimists, things like 
developmental bias, niche construction, and inclusive inher-
itance, as well as those phenomena highlighted by Watson 
et al. such as major transitions in individuality (Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry 1995) and ecosystem dynamics (Lean 
2018). These phenomena are characterized by feedback 
between different kinds and levels of causation that gener-
ate “correlations or covariations between components that 
were previously independent” (Watson and Szathmáry 2016, 
p. 153). So, for instance, what they call “EvoDevo” interac-
tions involve causal links between gene-regulatory networks 
and environmental parameters which together can modify 
the distribution of phenotypic variation; “EvoEco” how the 
cumulative interactions among communities of organisms 
modify selection pressures; and “EvoEgo,” how the interac-
tions among entities at various levels transform and change 
the mechanisms of inheritance.
To sum up: one way in which optimists seem to argue for 
the value of reciprocal causation, and for the EES framework 
more generally, is by emphasizing its empirical aptness. But 
as I hope to have shown, proponents of the EES argue for 
such aptness on the back of widespread consensus as to the 
existence and importance of a range of evolutionary phe-
nomena. So far, little in the debate between optimists and 
skeptics suggests that reciprocal causation illuminates new 
explanatory contrasts as of yet undiscovered by evolutionary 
researchers. Yet the concept may play a central role in new 
directions of research, where mutually influencing causal 
relationships at multiple levels are important. I have high-
lighted the research of Watson et al. here, but I could have 
equally pointed towards the exciting graph theoretical and 
dynamical systems models of gene-network effects (e.g., 
Salazar-Ciudad 2006b; Jaeger et al. 2012). In short, though 
reciprocal causation may not identify or isolate “new’’ or 
“neglected” evolutionary phenomena, it may already be 
playing a role in structuring ongoing research into funda-
mental evolutionary questions.
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Rigging the System
One interesting empirical hypothesis floated by EES opti-
mists concerns how the complex web of feedforward and 
feedback causal interactions that characterize biologi-
cal phenomena might ultimately underpin the models of 
consensus practice. As Laland et al. (2013a) suggest, the 
empirical success of standard evolutionary models may 
occur in virtue of underlying reciprocal causation. That is, 
reciprocal causation explains why the fractionated, unidi-
rectional causal models work:
The external world is likely to be capricious but the 
selective environment is what matters to evolving 
organisms and if the selective environment retains 
some constancy across generations (or is changed in 
predictable ways), inductive gambles are more likely 
to pay off. This means that we would expect evolu-
tionarily successful organisms to transform their selec-
tive environment in predictable ways … effectively, to 
“load the dice” as well as predicting the outcome of 
the roll. (Laland et al. 2013a, pp. 739–740)
Here, organisms that “transform their selective environ-
ment” are those engaged in the reciprocal process.
I take it that the argument goes something like this: 
(1) differences in trait fitnesses reflect the relationship 
between traits and environments; (2) unless the fitnesses 
of particular traits are (somewhat) stable over time, direc-
tional and cumulative selection cannot occur; (3) key 
components ensuring the stability of selection pressures 
over time are the activities of the organisms themselves; 
and (4) such organismic activities are best characterized 
in terms of reciprocal causation. Thus, to the extent that 
the models of consensus practice assume relatively stable 
selection pressures in their models, they tacitly appeal to 
the stabilizing effect of organismic activity.
This is a substantial empirical claim. Laland et  al. 
(2013a, p. 739) argue in support of it by pointing to a 
range of “buffering” activities, notably, the “counterac-
tive” niche-constructing activities of termites, birds, and 
mammals. Perhaps the clearest example of what they 
call “counteractive niche construction” comes from the 
mound-building activity of termites (Turner 2000). Ter-
mites in the genus Macrotermes build large complex struc-
tures with distinct chambers for food storage, breeding, 
and the like. What is remarkable about these structures is 
the way in which they are constantly modified and changed 
so as to maintain viable living conditions. In the face of 
wide variation in climatic conditions, these termite colo-
nies are able to modify the structure of the mound in order 
to regulate the circulation of oxygen and carbon dioxide, 
as well as to modulate the temperature of the colony.
Similar arguments can be found in evolutionary develop-
mental biology. Kirschner and Gerhart (2005, 2007) have 
argued that structural features of developing organisms—
notably, suites of modularized, exploratory, and weakly 
regulated processes—facilitate genetic change over evolu-
tionary time (here we should read “facilitating” in terms of 
making possible). This is because these structural features 
engender that organisms are built with sufficient robustness, 
redundancy, and plasticity to accommodate variation among 
a number of elements. Such variation is constantly tested for 
viability, in part through interactions with the environment. 
On this account, variation is generated, accumulated, and 
expressed in a manner sensitive to organismic functioning. 
Selection on variation thus only comes about in virtue of the 
stabilizing characteristics of organisms.
Like other EES arguments considered above, there are 
two ways of interpreting the claims being made here. A 
weak interpretation has it that structural and behavioral fea-
tures help to keep organisms viable. This is the idea that 
organisms act so as “to increase the chance that [they] and 
their descendants will remain within their tolerance spaces” 
(Laland et al. 2013a, p. 739). So stated this weak interpreta-
tion is obvious. After all, organisms engage in a wide range 
of activities—acquiring food, excreting waste, fighting path-
ogens—in order to increase their viability and opportunities 
for reproduction.
A stronger interpretation has it that structural features of 
organisms and some aspects of behavior provide constraints 
on the variation available for selection. Constraint, here, 
should be read like “facilitated” above: constraints structure 
the variations visible to selection by rendering some more 
likely, and others less likely. On this stronger interpretation, 
counteractive niche construction and facilitated variation are 
instances of constraints generated by reciprocal causal pro-
cesses. These causal interactions—among organisms, their 
parts, and their environments—together “rig the system” so 
as to underpin both the stability of selection, and make some 
selective outcomes more likely than others.
Constraints can be part of evolvability explanations—why 
certain populations are more likely to evolve certain out-
comes than another population—as we saw with the work of 
Watson et al. above. Selection can only act upon viable vari-
ation, and constraints determine what kind of viable variants 
are made available (Lewens 2004). Understanding selective 
trajectories should indeed include considerations about the 
typical range of variants that populations are likely to pro-
duce in addition to considering how different environments 
might affect the distribution of such variation (cf. Brown 
2014). But one should not oversell ideas around stabilization 
and constraint. It may be true that the way that organisms are 
put together and interact with their environment constrains 
both possible and viable variation. But unless determinis-
tic, constraints do not determine outcomes, only modify the 
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likelihood of certain variations occurring. So even acknowl-
edging constraints on variation leaves open the possibility 
that selection might play a powerful creative and directional 
role. Indeed, as Lewens (2004) argues, both the nature of, 
and relationship between, constraints and selection are com-
plex and sensitive to the empirical concerns at hand. There 
will not be a one-size-fits-all approach that determines how 
constraints should be weighed against selection.
In this way, the EES represents the latest iteration of the 
long debate about the relationship between constraint and 
selection (Amundson 1994; Salazar-Ciudad 2006a). As the 
above makes clear, EES optimists take constraints to rep-
resent an underappreciated area of research. Yet skeptics 
continue to—reasonably, one might add—push back on the 
idea that developmental or behavioral constraints play an 
outsized role in shaping the variation visible to selection 
(e.g., Hoekstra and Coyne 2007)—perhaps by assuming 
that such constraints are equally present or invariant across 
multiple phyla or selection events (cf. Lewens 2004). These 
are questions that are increasingly under investigation, for 
instance, in empirical studies exploring the constraints on 
brain size (Logan et al. 2018) and limb length (Young et al. 
2010), as well as sophisticated simulation studies that test 
optimization hypotheses (e.g., Salazar-Ciudad and Marín-
Riera 2013). The prevalence and importance of developmen-
tal and behavioral constraint is a source of genuine disagree-
ment between EES optimists and skeptics. While both camps 
put forward competing bets about the causal relevance of 
constraints on evolutionary change—these are bets that can-
not be settled without substantial empirical investigation.
Keeping an Open Mind
EES optimists hold that reciprocal causation both motivates 
theoretical and methodological pluralism and that such plu-
ralism is increasingly needed in the biological sciences 
(Laland et al. 2011, 2013a, b, 2014, 2015). Underpinning 
the urgency of their concerns is a diagnosis that current work 
in evolution is in some way blinkered. “Blinkered” is used 
here as a term of art that highlights the way that theoretical 
frameworks render evidence, concepts, and methodologies 
invisible or inaccessible to consensus practice.
This blinkered perspective is manifest in the lack of rec-
ognition afforded to the empirical and conceptual posits of 
the EES. This includes the phenomena described above, at 
least niche construction, organismic constraints, and evolv-
ability. EES optimists blame this parochialism on assump-
tions that stabilize consensus practice. Key among these is 
evolutionary externalism. This position holds that organisms 
fare better or worse in virtue of the way their organismic 
form is apt to deal with external circumstances.
Evolutionary externalism is an “outside-in” style of inves-
tigation. It holds that understanding the evolution of organ-
isms, and why they have the forms that they do, requires 
knowledge about the environments that have shaped the 
organism. Two alternatives to externalism are internalism 
and constructivism (Godfrey-Smith 1996). Internalism 
contrasts with externalism in being an “inside-out” style 
of investigation. Here, the evolution of organismic form is 
related to constraints, limitations, and directionality imposed 
by the organism itself. Both contrast with evolutionary con-
structivism, where the organism structures or co-constitutes 
its environment leading to evolutionary changes in form 
(Lewens 2004; Walsh 2015).
So when EES proponents argue that consensus practice 
in evolution is blinkered, what they mean is that consensus 
practice implicitly endorses evolutionary externalism. Yet 
how do EES optimists see this favoring taking place? Unsur-
prisingly, they see the problem as having to do with causa-
tion: the “manner in which biologists think about causality 
has acted like a meta-theoretical conceptual framework to 
stabilize the dominant scientific paradigm” (Laland et al. 
2013a, p. 740). Because of this metatheoretical framework, 
EES optimists argue, alternative internalist investigatory 
practices (EvoDevo, DevoEvo) or constructivist ones (niche 
construction, gene-culture coevolution, EcoEvoDevo) have 
been unfairly marginalized. So if this is the problem, what 
is the solution?
The methodological revision that EES optimists push for 
is one where “potential causal influence should not be ruled 
out a priori” (Laland et al. 2013a, p. 738). For this to occur, 
proponents argue, evolutionary theory needs a framework 
“that allows for feedback encompassed in dynamic cycles 
of cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution and organ-
ism-environment coevolution” (Laland et al. 2013a, pp. 
737–738). Reciprocal causation, we are told, can provide 
the foundations of such a framework.
What this new framework entails is not, as far as I can 
tell, the wholescale replacement of externalist investigative 
strategies with internalist or constructivist ones.6 Instead, 
externalist investigations merely need to be reframed. Such 
investigations should be understood to be occurring in 
unique circumstances; they are a “special case of recipro-
cal causation where feedback is negligible” (Laland et al. 
2013a, p. 738).
There is a substantive worry motivating these arguments. 
Yet it is hard to see. To make these worries more visible, 
I want to develop an analogy to Elisabeth Lloyd’s (2005, 
6 Others have made the case that a new synthesis should have a 
strong internalist bent (notably Robert 2004; and Pigliucci and Müller 
2010).
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2015) well-known arguments around the role of adaptation-
ist thinking in evolutionary thinking.
Broadly, adaptationism is a position holding that the 
adaptiveness or seemingly well-designed character of organ-
isms is important, if not central, to the consensus practice of 
evolutionary theory. Precisely what it means to be “impor-
tant” here is more contentious, and commentators have 
identified and evaluated a range of adaptationist positions 
(Godfrey-Smith 2001; Lewens 2009). Here what we are con-
cerned with is methodological adaptationism.
Methodological adaptationism can exist in stronger or 
weaker forms. Keeping with current concerns, consider 
Lloyd’s picture of insidious methodological adaptationism.7 
This insidious adaptationism plays a role in setting research 
objectives and structuring investigations by determining 
the legitimacy of hypotheses, setting explanatory contrast 
classes, and regulating standards of evidence. Operating 
under insidious methodological adaptationism, investiga-
tions target the adaptive character of traits and are not com-
plete until the most plausible adaptationist hypothesis has 
been settled upon. Only when no adaptationist hypothesis is 
well supported can alternate frameworks be considered. As 
Lloyd argues, this adaptationist-first strategy marginalizes 
other explanations; for instance, that traits are the result of 
exaptation, drift, or developmental constraint. This margin-
alization is where a “nonselective hypothesis is often treated 
as the failure to find an explanation” (Lloyd 2015, p. 356) 
rather than an alternative hypothesis worthy of investigation.
Lloyd’s (2005) key example of such insidious methodo-
logical adaptationism centers on the evolution of the female 
orgasm. She champions the view that the female orgasm 
is a byproduct resulting from selection on male orgasms: 
the tissue and nervous connections that support female 
orgasms result from developmental structures common to 
all humans, yet the reason why these structures and pathways 
exist at all is because of prior selection for such structures in 
males deep in the mammalian clade. On this account, even 
though the female orgasm has no adaptive function—being 
a byproduct of selection on male orgasms—it is nonethe-
less real.
As Lloyd convincingly shows (2015, pp. 351–359), 
despite empirical evidence for the byproduct account of 
female orgasm, insidious methodological adaptationism 
marginalizes such evidence and downplays the byproduct 
account. Though a plausible evolutionary hypothesis with 
evidence adduced in its favor, this account “is not on their 
list of possible answers, which only includes answers like: 
‘The function of the female orgasm is to preferentially mate 
with high-quality males,’ or ‘the function of female orgasm 
is to aid the pair bond,’ etc.” (Lloyd 2015, p. 358; emphasis 
in original).
Lloyd’s discussion as to how methodological adaptation 
dismisses nonselective hypotheses is subtle, and I do not 
have the space to get into its details here. Suffice to say that 
Lloyd blames false explanatory dichotomies, lack of “stop-
ping rules,” an inability to recognize alternative sources of 
evidence, and a marginalization of nonselective hypotheses 
as uninteresting “nulls.” These standards perpetuate insidi-
ous methodological adaptationism and lead consensus prac-
tice to ignore other important sources of explanation.
With this in hand, let us shift back to consider reciprocal 
causation. As I see it, EES optimists are running an analo-
gous argument. That is, they argue that unidirectional causa-
tion is part of an explanation for insidious methodological 
externalism: a blinkered approach to understanding evolu-
tionary phenomena that marginalizes internalist or construc-
tivist alternatives. Here is how the argument works. There is 
a default assumption in evolutionary biology that organismic 
traits persist in populations because they solve environmen-
tal problems. Researchers thus explain why organisms have 
evolved the way that they have by understanding the selec-
tive environments of the past. But this investigative strategy 
ignores other kinds of explanatory contrasts that frontload 
the role of constraints, genomic architectures, niche con-
struction, and the like. Moreover, this investigative strategy 
is in fact insidious; it leads to the neglect and marginaliza-
tion of internalist or constructionist alternatives.
This reconstruction of EES optimists’ argument helps to 
make sense of a number of their claims; for instance, the one 
cited above that causal assumptions “stabilize” consensus 
practice. Causal assumptions can play such a role insofar 
as they lead researchers to neglect or discount alternative 
causal models. So too can this interpretation make sense 
of Laland et al. (2013a) claims that, “whether a process is 
characterized as proximate or ultimate depends critically on 
the conceptual framework of the researcher” (p. 720) with 
such a conceptual framework acting to “constrain the set of 
hypotheses that are deemed to be competing” (p. 729).
Take an instance of reciprocal causation, say, the dam-
constructing behavior of beavers. Such a behavior exists 
because of previous instances of selection: there was either 
selection for proto-dam-constructing behavior or selection 
for plastic mechanisms that could be later co-opted into 
processes of dam-constructing. In either instance, popula-
tions of beavers reacted to environmental circumstances, and 
those that survived had a genetic predisposition to produce 
7 Though I call such methodological adaptationism insidious, this is 
not meant to suggest a vast conspiracy. Historians and sociologists of 
science have long noted how regimes of teaching (Kuhn 1996), tech-
nologies (Kohler 1994), as well as social structures and power rela-
tions (Shapin and Schaffer 1985) can lead to the perpetuation of some 
research objectives, investigative strategies, tools, and explanations at 
the expense of others. It is this mundane sense—that the practice of 
science is influenced by material, sociological, and political causes—
that I have in mind here.
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dams or to acquire behavior to produce dams. Note that 
according to this story, reciprocal causation has a limited 
explanatory role in evolution, characterizing the causal rela-
tionships of proximate mechanisms whose dynamics are the 
expression of latent genetic variation resulting from past 
selective episodes.
Such a narrative vindicates evolutionary externalism: 
proximate mechanisms are merely the outcome of previous 
instances of externalist selection. But this strategy achieves 
success by ignoring or downplaying internalist or construc-
tivist alternatives. It ignores the possibility that plastic mech-
anisms may have both been central to the origin and main-
tenance of dam-constructing behavior in virtue of their role 
in creating a suitable dam-constructing environment. This, 
EES optimists might argue, is an instance of how evolution-
ary investigations can be blinkered. The narrative denies that 
reciprocal causal processes, like niche construction, play an 
important evolutionary role insofar as it reinterprets niche 
construction merely in terms of previous rounds of selection. 
Just as there is insidious methodological adaptationism, so 
too may there be insidious evolutionary externalism.
This is an important line of argument. Yet its success 
requires that optimists secure a number of contentious 
claims. These are points where skeptics might reasonably 
push back.
First, skeptics might reasonably doubt that insidious 
externalism is as central or widespread as insidious adapta-
tionism. There are, to be sure, radical externalists. Williams 
(1992), for instance, is barefaced in espousing this position, 
stating that, “Adaptation is always symmetrical; organisms 
adapt to their environments, never vice versa” (p. 484). Yet 
to what extent are these views of Williams representative of 
consensus practice? Work in evolutionary ecology, evolu-
tionary developmental biology, and ecological evolutionary 
biology seems to show that there is room in contemporary 
evolutionary science for internalist and constructivist expla-
nations. The increasing prevalence of work examining the 
architecture of gene-regulatory networks in development—
the homeobox-regulated development of crustacean limbs, 
to take just one example (Martin et al. 2016)—suggests that 
insidious externalism may not be embedded in the practice 
of all evolutionary researchers.
These concerns can be amplified. Let me return to con-
sidering the image of consensus practice projected by EES 
optimists. Above I noted that such optimists tend to put for-
ward a historical narrative that sees contemporary consensus 
practice as organized around a central core constituted by the 
models and assumptions of population genetics. Yet above 
I also noted that many historians, evolutionary research-
ers, and philosophers voice skepticism about such a nar-
rative: both its identification of a single event that could be 
called the Modern Synthesis, and that there was a coalescing 
around the modelling assumptions of population genetics. 
Along the same lines, I pointed to work from Love (2010, 
2013) that suggests that work in the life sciences may be 
more eclectically organized.
Taken together, these considerations put pressure on the 
claims of a blinkered evolutionary science. Though some 
areas of consensus practice may be inimical to internalist or 
constructivist claims, others will be more welcoming. And 
unsurprisingly, work in evolutionary developmental biol-
ogy and on gene-regulatory networks is precisely where one 
would expect internalist assumptions to hold sway.
Yet just because few individuals are bold enough to 
articulate radically externalist views should not be taken as 
evidence that such views are rare. And just because some 
domains of evolutionary research are open to internalist and 
constructivist positions does not mean that all are. But what 
these skeptical lines of engagement do show is that to secure 
a claim of insidiousness, EES optimists will require a great 
deal of evidence and analysis.
Unfortunately, I do not have the time nor space to try and 
marshal such evidence here—though I note that Uller and 
Helanterä (2019) do provide a clear articulation of the logic 
that might underpin such an insidious position. And such a 
task is demanding. Consider that Lloyd (2005) dedicated 
an entire manuscript—surveying all available accounts at 
the time—in order to document the methodological and 
empirical flaws at work in empirical research around the 
female orgasm. In addition, she then showed how such flaws 
could plausibly be attributed to background assumptions of 
adaptationism, human uniqueness, and androcentrism. Lloyd 
not only demonstrates the existence of problems, but also 
devotes considerable effort to showing how such problems 
derive from insidious assumptions. A similar evidentiary bar 
would be required by EES optimists to secure their claims 
of insidious externalism.
So while EES optimists have some reasons for their 
claims, their claims here are at best promissory. At the 
moment, they amount to showing that the assumptions of 
fractionation and externalism highlight certain kinds of 
explanatory contrasts over others. What they also show is 
how such assumptions might plausibly lead to a kind of 
insidious logic. This is not nothing. But what they have not 
yet done is secured a claim of insidiousness.
Conclusion
Concepts find a range of different uses in scientific practice. 
Often, they are directly engaged with empirical practice, 
picking out specific categories, mechanisms, or processes in 
the world relevant to researchers. Yet even while deeply tied 
to empirical use, concepts overlap with a range of other func-
tions. They can facilitate exchange and collaboration, mark 
out and distinguish communities of like-minded researchers, 
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structure investigations, highlight avenues of pursuit, and 
draw our attention to unfamiliar or less-than-attended-to 
phenomena. Here I have tried to highlight how reciprocal 
causation plays a wide range of roles well beyond the sim-
ple identification of mutual influence between processes. In 
highlighting these roles, I hope to have disentangled some 
distinct lines of argumentation knotted around the EES. In 
so doing, I have had as my aim a more productive and help-
ful dialogue around contemporary evolutionary research, as 
well as a clearer understanding of the outstanding issues that 
these lines of argumentation support.
I do not pretend to have come to definite conclusions 
about either the nature of the reciprocal causation concept or 
the EES. As things currently stand, the optimists’ alternate 
vision of evolutionary change, as well as their theoretical 
and conceptual tools, are still inchoate and incomplete. Yet 
even so, optimists’ arguments engage consensus practice on 
many fronts. Moreover, these engagements touch upon fun-
damental issues in evolutionary theory. Even if consensus 
practice remains largely unchanged from these confronta-
tions, the interaction may be a productive one—and if so, the 
positive epistemic value of the EES more generally may lay 
beyond the somewhat overhyped claims to modify, update, 
and extend evolutionary theory. Instead, its value may lie in 
bringing to light and interrogating longstanding assumptions 
of consensus practice. Here, in disaggregating the arguments 
around the reciprocal causation concept, I hope to have con-
tributed to such a productive dialectical engagement.
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